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Defendant\Appellant
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This appeal is from a Sentence of five years to life after a
conviction of Burglary, a Second Degree Felony in violation of
U.C.A. § 76-6-202 after a jury trial with the Honorable Michael D.
Lyon presiding.

The appellant was tried in the Second District

Court of Weber County on the 20th and 21st days of May, 1996.
On June 21, 1995, the Appellant was sentenced pursuant to
U.C.A. §76-3-203.5, as a habitual criminal, to serve a term of five
years to life on the charge of Burglary, and a term of six months
on the charge of Theft.

The Appellant's sentences are to be served

concurrently to each other, but consecutive to all other sentences
previously imposed. Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal
is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §782a-3'2)(f)

(1953, as amended) and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I
The

trial

court

committed

error

when

it

sentenced

the

Appellant as an habitual offender under U.C.A. §76-3-203.5 to an
enhanced

sentence

of

five years to life on the conviction of

Burglary, a second degree felony.
Standard of Review
Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed for
correctness, granting no deference to a trial courts determination.
Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2 84 Utah Adv. Rep. 2 7 (Ct. App.
1996)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES
U.C.A § 76-3-203 .5

Habitual Violent Offender - Definition Procedure - Penalty

(1)

As provided in this section:
(a)
"Felony" means any offense against a criminal
statute of the state, any other state, the United States, or
any district, possession, or territory of the United States
for which the maximum punishment the offender may be subjected
to exceeds one year in prison.
(b) "Habitual violent offender" means a person convicted
within the state of any violent felony and who, on at least
two previous occasions as prided in Subsection (2), has been
convicted of a violent felony and committed to either prison
in Utah or an equivalent correctional institution of another
state or of the United States either at initial sentencing or
after revocation of probation.
(c) (i) "Violent felony" means an felony violation of:
(P) aggravated robbery and robbery under
Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3, Robbery;
(ii) any felony offense against a criminal statute
of any other state, the United States, or any
district, possession, or territory of the United
States which could constitute a violent felony as
defined in this subsection if committed in this
state.
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U.C.A. § 76-4-101

Attempt

(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an
attempt tc commit a crime if, acting wich zhe kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense,
he engages in conduct cor.^cituting a substantial step tcvard
commission of the offense.
(2)
For purposes of this part, conduct dees not constitute a
substantial seep unless it is strongly corroborative of the
actor's intent to commit the offense.
U.C.A. § 76-6-301

Robbery- -- Current Statute

(1)

A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or
attempts to take personal p r o p e r t " :~ the possession of
another from his person, or immediate presence, against
his will, by means of force or fear; or
(b) the person i;ice**cionally or knowingly uses force or
fear of immediate force against another in the course of
committing a theft.
(2)
An act shall be considered "in the course of committing
a theft'1 if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or
commissi::...
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
U.C.A. §76-6-301

Robbery -- Old Statute

(1) Robbery is zhe
unlawful and intentional taking of
personal property in the possession of another from his
person, or immediate presence, against his will, accomplished
by means of force or fear.
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
U.C.A. § 76-8-1001
(Repealed 1995)

Habitual

criminal

-

Determination.

Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and
committed for felony offenses at least one of which offenses
having been at least a second degree felony or a crime which,
if committed within this state would have been a capital
felony, first degree felony, or second degree felony, and was
committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at least a
second degree felony committed in this state, other than
aggravated murder or murder, be determined as a habitual
criminal and be imprisoned in the state prison for from five
vears to life.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant was convicted of Burglary, a Second Degree
Felony, and Theft, a Class B Misdemeanor, after a jury trial in the
Second District Court of Weber County.

based upon the fact

that

the trial

The Appellant now appeals

court

committed

error

when it

sentenced him as an habitual criminal, when attempted robbery was
not an offense specifically enumerated as a violent offense.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Defendant was charged with Burglary, a second degree
felony, and Theft, a class A misdemeanor in the Second Circuit
Court in Weber County in December of 1994.
The Defendant went

to trial

on December 4, 1995.

prosecutor elicited improper testimony from a witness.

The

Defense

counsel moved the court for a mistrial and the motion was granted.
(Trial T. 35)

On May 21, 1996, a second trial was held, and the

Defendant was convicted of the burglary and theft.

(Trial T. 175)

Prior to the second trial, the State notified the trial court
and

the Defendant, by

information,

of

their

intent

to seek

sentencing pursuant to the habitual criminal statute found at
U.C.A. § 76-3-203.5. The State's assertion that the Defendant was
a habitual

criminal was based upon his prior convictions of

Attempted Robbery in 1981 and his conviction of Burglary in 1983.
Both parties submitted memorandums addressing the habitual offender
statute as it applied to this case. (Addendum A)
Prior to the Defendant's first trial, the legislature amended
the Theft statute to make the offense a class B misdemeanor,
4

repealed the habitual offender provision found in U.C.A. § 76-81001 and enacted in its place U.C.A § 76-3-203.5 (effective May 1,
1995) , and amended the Robbery provision U.C.A. 76-6-301 to include
the crime of attempted robbery.
The current robbery statute found at U.C.A. §76-6-301 includes
the crime of attempted robbery. At the time that the defendant was
convicted of attempted robbery, the crime was addressee binder a
separate "attempt" provision of the Utah Code, U.C.A. § 76-4-101.
The Defendant's conviction of attempted robbery is not a violent
offense as defined under the current habitual criminal statute.
The current statute, U.C.A. §76-3-203.5 (c) (i) (P) , provides that
Robbery and Aggravated Robbery are violent felonies. However, the
statute does not list Attempted Robbery as a violent felony.
At sentencing, the State argued that the Defendant's conviction of attempted robbery was a violent offense because attempted
robbery was now pare of the Robbery statute.

(Sentencing T. 2-7)

The sentencing court found that the Defendant's conviction of
Attempted Robbery was a violent offense for purposes of the new
habitual criminal statute, and that the new habitual offender
statute applied to the Defendant's case.

(Sentencing T. 13 14 &

Addendum B) •
Over the objections of defense counsel, the sentencing court
sentenced the Defendant as a habitual criminal and imposed a
sentence of five years to life for the conviction of Burglary and
six months for the conviction of Theft.

These sentences were

ordered to run concurrent to each other and consecutive to all
5

other

previous

felony

convictions

the

Defendant

was

serving.

(Sentencing 14-19)
Appellant now appeals his sentence based upon the fact that
the trial court abused its discretion

in sentencing him as an

habitual offender.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The current habitual criminal statute, U.C.A. §76-3-203.5,
specifically defines offenses which are considered violent felonies
for the purposes of penalty enhancement within the State of Utah.
The statute defines Robbery and Aggravated Robbery, but specifically excludes of Attempted Robbery.
to

enhance

the

Appellants

The reliance upon this statute

sentence

was

erroneous

since

the

Appellant had not been convicted of Robbery as the statute now
requires.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT
SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT AS AN HABITUAL
CRIMINAL PURSUANT TO U.C.A. § 76-3-203.5
The

trial

court

committed

error

when

it

found

that

the

Appellant's previous conviction of Attempted Robbery was a violent
offense as defined by U.C.A. §76-3-203.5. Statutory interpretation
is

a

question

of

law

reviewed

for

correctness,

deference to a trial courts determination.

granting

no

Bellonio v. Salt Lake

City Corp.. 284 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Ct. App. 1996)
The Appellant was convicted of Attempted Robbery in 1981.

At

the time of his conviction, U.C.A. §76-6-301 stated "robbery is the
unlawful

and

intentional

taking
6

of

personal

property

in

the

possession of another from his person or immediate presence,
against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear". Robbery
was a felony of the second degree*

At that time, attempts were

codified under U.C.A. §76-4-101 which stated:

"for purposes of

this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the
commission of the offense, engages

in conduct constituting a

substantial step towards the commission of the offense."
In 199 5, the Utah State Legislature amended the Robbery
statute as well as the Habitual Offender statute.

The current

robbery statute incorporates attempted robbery as an element of
robbery.

Therefore, there is no separate offense of Attempted

Robbery, and a person guilty of an attempt to commit robbery will
be convicted of Robbery.
The current habitual criminal statute specifically defines
offenses which are considered violent felonies.

Two of those

offense are aggravated robbery and robbery. Attempted robbery was
excluded under the new statute as a violent offense.

Had the

former habitual criminal statute, U.C.A. §76-8-1001 applied to the
Appellant in this case, there would be no question that his 1981
conviction of Attempted Robbery and his 1983 conviction of Burglary
would qualify. However, the classification of the 1981 conviction
as Attempted Robbery precludes the court from applying it to the
current habitual offender statute.

Thereby making the Appellant

exempt from an enhancement pursuant to that section.
In determining legislative intent, the appellate courts have
7

consistently ruled that "the best evidence of the legislature's
intent is the plain meaning of the statute."
City Corp., 898 P.2d 265 (Utah 1995).

Nixon v. Salt Lake

The plain meaning of this

statute expressly enumerates offenses which are considered violent
felonies.

Attempted Robbery is not one of them.

The legislature

knew

they

to

what

"attempted"

are

doing.

offenses,

If

they would

they

intended

have

enacted

cover

prior

a provision

to

include attempted robbery.
The plain language of the statute leads one to believe that
the

legislature

specifically

excluded

attempted

crimes

because

they, by their very nature, involve a lesser degree of conduct; as
evidenced by the fact that an Attempted Robbery in 1981 was a third
degree felony.
The United

States Court of Appeals

for the Tenth Circuit

recently look at a similar issue and ruled that Attempted Burglary
could not be used for enhancement purposes when Burglary was a
predicate offense.
cannot

conclude

In making that ruling the Court stated:

that

Congress

intended

implicitly

to

"We

include

attempted burglary as a violent offense when it specified burglary
as a violent felony under 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

If Congress intended

attempted burglary to be a predicate offense, therefore, it must
fall within the category of. offenses which 'otherwise involve[]
conduct that presents a serous potential risk of physical injury to
another. ,n 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (2) (B) (ii) .
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Further, the Court stated

that the statute "should be construed narrowly and applied only to
those categories of offenses which clearly meet the statutory
test".

United States v. Strahl, 938 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992)

Similarly, in this case, if the Legislature intended Attempted
Robbery to be included as a violent felony, they should have
specifically enumerated it as such.

This Court cannot find that

the Legislature intended to cover attempts under the previous code
when they failed to specifically delineate it as a violent felony.
CONCLUSION
In

enacting

the

current

habitual

offender

statute,

the

legislature specifically enumerated offenses which they considered
as violent

f-l~nies.

Attempted Robbery was not

specifically

defined as a vi^ent felony, and therefore should not considered by
the trial court when it enhanced the Appellant's sentence.

Based

upon the foregoing, this Court must reverse the Appellant's current
sentence

and

remand

the

case

back

to

the

trial

court

resentencing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ ^

day of December) 1996

^1
A t t o r n e y Trrr—Appellant
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for

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two true and
correct copies of the above and foregoing Brief to the following:
Attorney General's Office
ATTN: Criminal Appeals
150 East 300 South, 6th floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
DATED this

,y vf

day of December, 19>6*
Cent^;
Attorney for Apjpe!
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ADDENDUM "A"

PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION,
INC., OF WEBER COUNTY
Attorneys for Defendant
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 203
Ogden, Utah 8 44 01
Telephone: (801) 392-8247
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT'S POSITION
NOT TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT
AS AN HABITUAL CRIMINAL

vs
DAVID A. GALLEGOS,

Case No. 941900938
Defendant,

Judge Michael D. Lyon

COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his attorney, John
T. Caine, and hereby
Defendant's

Position

submits this Memorandum
that he should

in Support of

not be Sentenced

as an

Habitual Criminal, pursuant to Section 76-3-203.5 as amended, of
the Utah Code Annotated.
FACTS
The Defendant has reviewed the facts as set forth in paragraphs one through

six of the State's Memorandum, and agrees

with the facts submitted, one through five.

Paragraph

six is

argumentative and is not a fact, and therefore Defendant does not
agree with paragraph number six.

Two additional facts should be included.

In 1981, when the

Defendant was convicted for Attempted Robbery, a Third

Degree

Felony, the robbery provision then in place was Section 76-6-301,
which stated that "robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking
of personal property in the possession of another from his person
or immediate presence, against his will, accomplished by means
of force or fear, and that robbery was a felony of the second
degree."
which

"Attempt" was defined in a separate section, 76-4-101,

indicated

that

"for purposes of this part a person is

guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind
of culpability

otherwise required

offense, engages

for the commission of the

in conduct constituting a substantial

step

towards the commission of the offense."
DISCUSSION
The Defendant agrees with the State's position that had the
former

habitual

criminal statute, 76-8-1001, (U.C.A., 1953)

applied to the Defendant in this case, there would be no question
that his 1981 and 1983 convictions would qualify, and the penalty
enhancement could be utilized.
that it was

However, it is important to note

the State by motion, who insisted

that the new

habitual violent offender statute, which was enacted by the
Legislature

effective May 1, 1995, be applicable in this in-

stance, and

it is the confusion

position

resulting

from the

State's

and the 1981 conviction for Attempted Robbery that is

the gravamen of this case.
2

In

effect, the State has been, in the old vernacular,

"hoisted

on their own petard."

Under

the current

habitual

criminal

statute, it defines specifically offenses which are

considered violent felonies.

Two of those offenses are aggra-

vated

Attempted

robbery and robbery.

robbery is not defined

under the new statute because, as the State correctly points out,
under the new robbery provision of the Utah Code, 76-3-301, the
definition of robbery includes as a separate element, an attempt.
This was not the case in 1981 when the Defendant was convicted of
Attempted Robbery.

At that time, the robbery statute did not

include attempted robbery, and attempted offenses were defined in
a separate section, 76-4-101.
the

unfortunate

dichotomy

As such, the State is faced with
that under

the present

habitual

criminal statute, attempted robbery is not defined as a violent
offense, and attempted

robbery

in 1981 was not part of the

robbery statute which is currently defined as a violent offense.
The State now seeks to some how extrapolate some form of
legislative intent, which is not readily apparent, and convince
this Court that it should
existing

statute.

ignore the plain language of the

The plain

language

is that

in 1981

the

Defendant was convicted of Attempted Robbery, an offense which at
that time was not contained within the robbery statute.

No

matter how hard the State tries to confuse the issue, the fact is
that in 1981, based upon the Defendant's conduct, he was convicted of only Attempted Robbery.
3

In 1995, had the same conduct

been submitted to a judge or jury, he would have been convicted
of robbery, which

is one of the enumerated

habitual violent offenders

offenses

in the

statute, attempted robbery is not.

Because attempted robbery is not one of the enumerated offenses,
the

Defendant

therefore

habitual criminal.

does not meet the criteria

of

the

The legislature presumably knows what they

are doing, and if they intended to cover prior offenses which
were "attempted" offenses not included within the actual offense,
how easy it would have been for them to simply enact a provision
which codified that recognition of the differences in the concept
of attempt as amended under the new law.

An equally compelling

argument can be made that the legislative

intent was not to

include attempted offenses that were separate, because they, by
their very nature, involve lesser degrees of conduct, as evidenced

by the fact that an Attempted Robbery in 1981 is a 3rd

Degree Felony, whereas a conviction for Robbery including attempt
in 1995 is a 2nd Degree Felony.
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should not impose the
Habitual criminal penalties against the Defendant in this case.
DATED this i /

day of June,

r~r~

Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
—

-- -

-

I hereby certify that I did hand deliver a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Memorandum

in Support of

Defendant's

Position not to Sentence Defendant as an Habitual Criminal/ this

\C\

_day of June, 1996, to Gary R. Heward, Deputy Weber County

Attorney, 2549 Washington Blvd., 7th Floor, Ogden, Utah 84401.

foer> fjtiltr:
SECRETARY
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:

i° p{
GARY R. HEWARD, UBN 5085
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEYS OFFICE
7TH FLOOR MUNICIPAL BUILDING
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
TELEPHONE: (801)399-8377

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:
:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF STATE'S POSITION TO
SENTENCE DEFENDANT AS AN
HABITUAL CRIMINAL

vs.
DAVID A. GALLEGOS,

:

Case No. 94190093 8

Defendant.

:

Judge MICHAEL D. LYON

COMES NOW Gary R. Heward, Deputy Weber County Attorney, in and for the State of
Utah and hereby submits this Memorandum In Support of State's Position to Sentence Defendant
as an Habitual Criminal pursuant to Section 76-3-203.5 of the Utah Code Annotated.
FACTS
1.

Defendant was convicted in May, 1996 of the offense of Burglary. This is a

second degree felony offense.
2.

The Defendant has been previously convicted of two violent felony offenses in the

State of Utah: (1) a 1981 conviction for attempted robbery, a third degree felony; (2) a 1983
conviction for burglary, a second degree felony. The State has therefore charged the Defendant

with being an habitual criminal, a penalty enhancement provision applicable to individuals
convicted of a violent felony who have at least two prior convictions for violent felonies which
resulted in commitment to prison.
3.

In 1995, the Utah Legislature repealed the habitual offender provision, Utah Code

Ann. §§ 76-8-1001, 1002 (1991) effective May 1, 1995 and enacted in its place Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-203.5 (1995). Copies of these provisions are attached.
4.

In 1995, the Utah Legislature amended the Robbery provision, Utah Code Ann. §

76-6-301(1995) to include the crime of attempted robbery. This crime had previously been
addressed under the attempt provision, Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101. Copies of these provisions
are attached.
5.

In February of 1996, the State submitted, and this court accepted, a Memorandum

of Law which articulated the reasons for applying the 1995 statute to the Defendant in the present
case.
6.

The State asks this court to find that, although not articulated, attempted robbery

is a "violent felony" pursuant to § 76-3-203.5 Utah Code Ann. (1995).

DISCUSSION
Attempted robbery, as defined in the amended robbery provision, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6301 (1995)("Current Robbery Provision"), is a violent felony, and the Habitual Violent Offender

2

Statute thereby applies to Defendant. Because the changes to the Habitual Criminal Statute were
entirely procedural, the current Habitual Violent Offender statute ("New Habitual Offender
Statute") applies in this case. The new Habitual Offender Statute is codified as Utah Code Ann §
76-3-203.5(1995).
Under the old Habitual Offender Statute, Defendant would have been subject to the
enhancement, as the Defendant had twice been convicted, sentenced, and committed for felony
offenses, one of which (November, 1983 burglary offense) was at least a second degree felony.
The old Habitual Criminal Statute provides:
Habitual Criminal — Determination.
Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed for
felony offenses at least one of which offenses having been at least a second
degree felony or a crime which, if committed within this state would have
been a capital felony, first degree felony, or second degree felony, and was
committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at least a second degree
felony committed in this state, other than aggravated murder or murder, be
determined as a habitual criminal and be imprisoned in the state prison for
from five years to life.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1991).
Under the new Habitual Offender Statute, the previous convictions must fit into one of
many enumerated "violent" offenses. Subsection (P) provides that robbery as defined by the
current robbery provision, § 76-6-301, is such an offense. Under the current robbery provision,
"a person commits robbery if. . . the person lawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take . .
. " property by means of force or fear. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1995)(emphasis added).

J

Clearly, attempted robbery falls under this provision, and would be considered a "violent felony'
for purposes of the new habitual offender provision.
It runs contrary to legislative intent and public policy to allow this defendant to take
advantage of the "straddling" position of his offenses and the amended statute in order to avoid
the enhancement to habitual offender. The attempted robbery conviction would have met the
criteria for habitual offender status under the old habitual offender statute. Moreover, if
Defendant were convicted of attempted robbery today, it would fall under the new classifications
for habitual offender status. The problem lies in the fact that the Court must apply the new
habitual offender statute to the old attempted robbery statute.

ARGUMENT
L

Attempted Robbery is a Violent Offense
In 1995, the Utah Legislature amended the Utah Robbery Statute, Section 76-6-301 of the

Utah Code Ann., to include the attempt to commit robbery. This broad definition of robbery,
which the legislature intended, should also be construed as the definition intended under the
robbery provision of the new Habitual Offender Statute, section 76-3-203.5(l)(c)(i)(P) of the
Utah Code, which was also enacted in 1995.
The old Habitual Offender Statute, section 76-8-1001, did not require prior offenses to fall
into enumerated categories. Instead, a person who had been convicted of two previous felony

4

offenses, only one of which needed to be a second degree felony, was subject to habitual criminal
status upon conviction of a third offense, which was at least a second degree felony. Clearly,
defendant's prior convictions for burglary (2d degree felony) and attempted robbery (3d degree
felony) would have satisfied his classification as an habitual offender upon this most recent
conviction for burglary (2d degree felony).
Moreover, the Utah Court of Appeals, in a recent decision, has stated that "crimes of
violence are defined as such because of the substance of the offense." State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d
238, 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). In Gurr, the defendant appealed his conviction of possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person by maintaining that, because his previous offense had
been sentenced as a misdemeanor, he could not be considered a "restricted person." The court
stated that the defendant's status as a restricted person was "based on the substance rather than
the classification of [his] criminal history." IdL at 243. By way of analogy, the court stated that
"burglary is a violent crime not because it is a felony but because it is a forceful invasion of
another's property." Id at 244. In the present case, Defendant's conviction of attempted robbery
is a violent felony because of the substance of the crime, rather than the classification. Attempted
robbery, even under the old Robbery Statute, required the same criminal intent as the completed
act. That, coupled with the legislative intent, clearly shows that attempted robbery is a violent
offense.
The Court of Appeals has demonstrated that offenses are considered "violent" by virtue of

5

their substance, rather than their classification. In order to preserve the spirit of the law,
defendant's prior conviction for attempted robbery should be considered as an enumerated offense
pursuant to section of the new Habitual Offender Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3203.5(l)(c)(I)(P)(1995).
EL
The Legislature Intended for the Habitual Offender Statute to Apply to
Attempted Robbery.
The purpose of the habitual offender statute is to "make persistent offenders subject to
greater sanctions." State v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187, 190 (Utah 1983). To allow the defendant
to circumvent the spirit of the law because of fortuitous timing would be against public policy and
the intent of the Utah Legislature.
Subsection 2(a) of the current Habitual Offender Statute states that ~[t]he penalty
enhancement provisions of this section apply, if during the ten years immediately preceding the
commission of the violent felony, the person has been . . . convicted of any felony." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203.5(2)(a) (1995). The natural reading of this section is that the statute applies to
any offenses committed in the past ten years which would be classified as a violent offense under
the statute. This is further emphasized by the language of subsection l(c)(ii), which reads, in
relevant part: "any felony offense against a criminal statute of any other state . . . which would
constitute a violent felony as defined in this subsection if committed in this state." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203.5(l)(c)(ii)(1995). It is simply not logical that, had the defendant committed
attempted robbery in another state in 1981, it would fall under the enumerated offenses because it
6

"would constitute a violent felony as defined in this subsection if committed in this state," Id.
(emphasis added), but, because the offense was committed in Utah, it may not fall under the
enumerated offenses. This cannot be what the legislature intended.

CONCLUSION
Because attempted robbery is considered a "violent offense" for purposes of the new
Habitual Offender Statute, and would have satisfied the conditions for habitual offender status
under the old Habitual Offender Statute, the enhancement provision should be applied to the
Defendant's sentence. This is consistent with legislative intent and public policy. The State
therefore requests that this Court apply the Habitual Violent Offender enhancement to the
Defendant's sentence.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / j L day of June, 1996.

GAR££i HEWARD
DEPUTY WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY

ADDENDUM "B"

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

vs.

:

Case No. 941900938

:

JUDGE MICHAEL D. LYON

DAVID A. GALLEGOS,
Defendant.

The above entitled matter came before the Court on State's Motion to Sentence Defendant
as an Habitual Criminal. Defendant has been convicted of Burglary, a second degree felony, and
Theft, a class A misdemeanor. Defendant has been twice before been convicted of felony
offenses. The Court makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On May 20, 1996, Defendant was tried before a jury and found guilty as charged

of the offenses of burglary, a second degree felony, and theft, a class A misdemeanor.
2.

Defendant had previously been convicted of numerous offenses. Of relevance: a

1983 conviction for burglary, a second degree felony; a 1981 conviction for attempted robbery, a
third degree felony.
3.

In light of these previous convictions, the State charged the Defendant with being

an habitual criminal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 76-3-203.5 (1995) (hereinafter unew
habitual offender statute").

4

In 1995, the Utah legislature repealed the habitual offender provision, Utah Code

Ann § 76-8-1001, 1002 (1991) ("old habitual offender statute'), and enacted in its place the new
habitual offender statute, Utah Code Ann § 76-3-203 5 (1995)
5

The new statute enumerates offenses which are to be considered "violent offenses'

for purposes of applying the new habitual criminal statute to defendants Subsection (P) of this
statute lists Robbery as a violent offense
6

Also in 1995, the legislature amended the Robbery statute to incorporate the crime

of attempted robbery Utah Code Ann § 301 (1995) Therefore, attempted robbery is
considered a violent offense for purposes of the new habitual criminal statute
7

The crimes for which Defendant was convicted on May 20 1996 were committed

in 1994 The delay in bnngmg the Defendant to tnal was caused by Defendant's failure to appear
for the original tnal date in June 1995 A second tnal wai> set for December 1995, and Defendant
moved for additional information after a jury had been impaneled, further delaying the trial
8

In February of 1996, this Court determined that the changes in the habitual

offender statute were procedural in nature, and therefore, the new habitual offender statute would
apply in Defendant's case

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1

Defendant is properly charged as an habitual criminal pursuant to the new habitual

criminal statute Utah Code Ann § 76-3-203 5 (1995)
2

Defendant stipulated to the pnor convictions, to wit a 1983 conviction for

burglary, a second degree felony, and a 1981 conviction for attempted robbery
2

3.

Defendant would have properly been charged as an habitual criminal under the old

habitual criminal statute, as the requirement of being twice before "convicted, sentenced, and
committed for felony offenses at least one of which offenses having been at least a second degree
felony" have been satisfied.
4.

Defendant is properly charged under the new habitual criminal statute, as the

amendments to the statute are procedural in nature.
5.

Attempted robbery is considered a violent offense for purposes of the new habitual

criminal statute.
6.

The Legislative intent is clear in that attempted robbery is properly considered a

violent offense. This is evidenced by the 1995 legislative amendment to the robbery statute,
which now incorporates attempted robbery as a complete, violent offense. Utah Code Ann. § 766-301 (1995).
7.

The purpose of the habitual offender statute is to subject persistent offenders to

greater sanctions.
8.

Defendant is a persistent offender. Based on the nature and substance of the

offenses for which Defendant has been convicted, this Court finds that Defendant is not amenable
to rehabilitation.
9.

Because attempted robbery is currently defined as a violent offense, and Defendant

has previously been convicted of attempted robbery and of burglary, another violent offense,
Defendant is properly charged with being an habitual violent offender under the new habitual
offender statute.

3

ORDER
Therefore, this Court determines that the Defendant is properly charged, and accordingly
sentenced, with being an habitual criminal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.5 (1995).

DATED this

day of July, 1996.

MICHAEL D. LYON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Approved aA to form.

Attorney for Defendant
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ADDENDUM "C"

1

,!

2

II the matter of State of Utah vs. David A. Gallegos.

3

(I have read both of your memoranda that have been submitted to

4

" me.

5

|| the Court imposes sentence

THE COURT:

5
7

||

8

Counsel, ij

I assume you would like a chance to argue briefly before

MR. CAINE:

We would

THE COURT:

I will hear you.

MR. HEWARD:

9

This is the time set for sentencing in

Go ahead, Mr. Heward

Thank you, your Honor.

set for sentencing on Mr. Gallegos.

It is the time

You are well acquainted

10

with the facts in this case, and you are also well acquainted

11

with Mr. Gallegos based not only upon the pre-sentence report,

12

but based upon the numerous felony convictions that have gone

13

|| through this court, both by plea and by Jury determination

14 !l
15

since December of 1994 when this offense occurred

||

I think all of that is important, what's happened since

16

then in addition to what happened before, when you look at and

17

try and determine whether or not under the current state of

18

the law this Defendant is eligible to be sentenced as a

19

habitual criminal

20

As the Court is well aware we have been here for a time

21

period and there has been a determination by your Honor after

22

briefing from the State that the appropriate law to apply to

23

Mr. Gallegos is the law that was enacted in the spring of

24

1995.

25

reasoning of the State, wasn't necessarily we wanted the law

The reason for that, I believe you adopted the

2|

to apply to him, but felt like that's what the law mandated.
The change in the habitual criminal statute was procedural as
opposed to substantive.
Defendant.
5

Therefore they would apply to the

There were some changes in the way the habitual

II criminal statute was to be applied, most specifically as we

6

directed in the brief going away from the second degree felon^j

7

requirement, any second degree felony requirement, and

8

9
10

II specifically indicating that an individual must be convicted
of what is enumerated as a violent offense.

And there is

quite a list that is indicated there.

11

We believe that it is very important, your Honor, that

12

specifically the same year that the changes or the amendments

13

to that statute took place, also the changes or amendments

14

took place to the crime of robbery.

15

Gallegos was convicted back in 1981 or thereabouts of

16

attempted robbery, attempted robbery was a separate and

17

distinct offense from the crime of robbery.

18

pointed out in his response, it was covered by a specific

19

section.

20

required for an attempt, as opposed to the completion of the

21

act.

Specifically when Mr.

And as Mr. Caine

It still is a specific section setting out what is

22

The Legislature looked at that, your Honor, and it would

23

be our position made a determination that if someone goes out

24

and attempts to commit a robbery they are acting with the same]

25

mens re, they are putting individuals in the same position of

i

force or fear, and they are doing the same types of things as
far as trying to get person property from the person.
3
4

The

fact that they don't succeed in that, the Legislature's change
would indicate we believe that they view that as being

5

essentially the same conduct.

6

the law.

7

attempted robbery is all that is required for the completion

8

of the act.

9

And consequently they changed

They amended it as we specifically said.

An

The reason why we feel that is important that the

10

Legislature has indicated what its intent is by doing that is

11

they do not specifically list attempted robbery as one of the

12

enumerated offenses under the current statute.

13

position they don't need to list it, or their view was they

14

didn't need to list it, because robbery is done or can be

15

completed by an attempt just as it can by the completed act.

16
17
18

It is our

It is also clear, your Honor, that it is the Legislative
intent to apply habitual criminal status to individuals in thd
case that we cited you to, specifically to make persistent

19

offenders subject to greater sanctions.

20

that David Gallegos is a persistent offender.

21

it important when you look at Legislative intent—when I refer;

22

to that specific language, make persistent offenders subject

23

to greater sanctions, that's coming out of the State vs.

24

Montague, which is one of the cases we cited you to.

25

There is no question
And so we thinld

We also feel it is important, when looking at all the

1
2
3
4
5
6

facts and circumstances, to look at whether or not, even
though not specifically enumerated, attempted robbery is a
violent felony which they have determined what people will be
subject to greater penalty for.

Again when you look at the

cases that we have given you, the Gurr case, it becomes very
clear that it is the substance of the offense, not what it is

7

called, that makes something a violent felony.

8

you several different examples of that.

9

And they gave

When you look at all those types of things, and what it

10

is that the Legislature is attempting to do, as we put forth

11

in our brief, it is our position that the spirit of the law is

12

to treat individuals in Mr. Gallegos' position as persistent

13

violent offenders, which they are.

14

We do not believe because

it is not specifically enumerated as attempted robbery, again

15

because of the change, that this is someone who should have

16

the benefit of the straddling the position or putting forth

17

the position that he is.

18

specifically enumerated, I did it prior to the enactment of

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

And that is that it is not

the law, and therefore it shouldn't apply to me.
Mr. Gallegos is exactly the kind of individual who we
believe this Court needs to give the Board of Pardons the
opportunity to control for the rest of his life, whether that
is in a prison setting or whether that is in a parole setting
He has shown through his entire life that he is not someone
that can function without some very serious structure, whether!

it is in the form of incarceration or the form of parole.
It would be our position, your Honor, that Mr. Gallegos
is in fact an habitual criminal, and Mr. Gallegos* conduct is
exactly the kind of conduct that the Legislature intended you
to apply habitual offender status to.

We do not believe that

it is determinative that it doesn't say attempted robbery as
one of the enumerated offenses.

Again, as I indicated,

because of specifically the change in the law.
And because of those reasons, your Honor, because of the
arguments that we have set forth—and one additional one I
failed to mention.

But what is set out is that Mr. Gallegos

committed attempted robbery in another State.

When you go to

the statute listing enumerated offenses, the very last
paragraph that follows that indicates that other offenses
committed in other states will be considered violent offenses
if they would be considered a violent offense here.

If he

committed that attempted robbery in 1981 in the State of
Colorado or Wyoming or Idaho or anywhere else, and you were
trying to determine is it a violent offense, because of the
case authority we have cited we believe that would be
considered a violent offense and not the designation of
attempt or robbery would be determinative.

But what is the

substance of the offense.
When you look at all of those, and what the real intent
of the Legislature is, we believe they do intend habitual

1

criminal to apply to Mr. Gailegos.

2

Specifically we ask you tcr apply it consecutive to what he is

3
4
5
6

We ask you to apply it.

currently doing.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. CAINE:

Thank you.

Mr. Caine.

Mr. Heward, as he usually does, has written an excellent

7

memorandum.

8

philosophically a little different view.

9

to me that this isn't a situation of you having to decide

And in addressing it, I think I have
And that is it seems

10

whether Mr. Gallegos fits the type of person that this statut^

11

was enacted to apply to.

12

statute is either you are or you aren't, based upon the

13

statutory definitions of what an habitual criminal is.

14

I think the habitual criminal

And we have a problem in this case because we have had

15

two changes in the law, both of which pertain to this case.

16

And I tried to look in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme

17

Court since 1995 when both the robbery and the new habitual

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

criminal section came in to see if either of those courts had
specifically addressed the dichotomy that I see here.
they have not.

And

So this is truly a case of first impression,

at least on this issue.

And I agree with Mr. Heward, at this

point it would be easy had the prior habitual criminal statute)
that was in effect up until 1995 been applicable in this case.
There would be no argument here.

There is no question because]

of the definitions that were used in that statute that the twq
1\

1

wouldn't have otherwise have suffered.

2

he plainly would have been determined an habitual criminal.

Under the old statute

3

It is my interpretation of the statute, in looking at

4

what I think was the Legislative intent, which is shored up in)

5

[I the Court's mind because it changed the definition of the

6

robbery statute at the same time, that the Legislature

7

intended to include attempted robbery as a violent felony.

8

I believe that looking at the Defendant's record that he

9

|| is a persistent offender, one who the Legislature intended to

10

II target when they passed this statute.

11

II

12

|| criminal under Section 76-6-301

13

II

14

I therefore find him this morning to be an habitual

MR. HEWARD:
76-3-302.5.

15

Would—habitual criminal I believe is

Are you referring to the robbery section, 76-6?

THE COURT:

Well, I have written down the wrong

16

section.

17

this morning, and I am satisfied that he is an habitual

18

criminal.

19

legal conclusion the Court reaches in terms of the offender

20

status.

21

please--my finding that you serve—and based on the nature of

22

these offense and your history and your character and the fact|

23

Whatever the current statute is.

I read them both

That's the finding of the Court, as well as the

It is therefore—Mr. Gallegos, would you stand,

|| that you do not seem to be amenable to rehabilitation through

24

the criminal justice system in the past, the Court imposes twoj

25

consecutive five years to life sentences on the third degree
14

felony convictions that were entered in this Court.
The Court will run concurrent—
MR. CAINE:

Your Honor, excuse me, I think we

better—so the record is clarified, we have one second degree
felony and one class B misdemeanor.
MR. HEWARD:
7

||

MR. CAINE:
MR. HEWARD:

9

The theft conviction was a class B.
So one 5 to life.
I do not believe the enhancement

provisions would apply to the misdemeanor.

10

MR. CAINE:

That ! s correct.

11

THE COURT:

I have got the wrong report then.

I

12

have got—the report that I am looking at—was he sentenced in)

13

January?

14

MR. HEWARD:

Yes, on other offenses.

15

MR. CAINE :

That's what happened.

16
17
18

We didn't

actually have a new report on this.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Tell me again, refresh my memory,

this is the attempted—there was a robbery.

19

MR. CAINE:

No, he was convicted of burglary.

20

THE COURT:

Burglary.

21

MR. CAINE:

A second degree felony, which would now

22
23
24
25

be enhanced.
THE COURT

That was with his brother Joseph?

MR. CAINE

That's correct.

THE COURT

June 2 1 — I am sorry, May 20th.
15,

1

MR. CAINE:

2

Based upon your ruling that would be

enhanced to 5 to life.

3

class B misdemeanor.

4

He "was also convicted of theft, a
I think Mr. Reward is right, that

doesn ! t apply in the enhancement section.

5

THE COURT:

6

Okay, that is correct.

And under the

statute a 1 to 15 is enhanced to 5 years to life.

7

All right, then the Court amends the sentence and imposesj
one sentence of 5 years to life on the burglary conviction

9

that was rendered in this Court in June, and runs concurrently]

10

the sentence of 6 months in jail on the class B misdemeanor

11

conviction

12

Now, he was —

13

||

MR. CAINE:

You had previously—

14

"

THE COURT:

I sentenced him previously in January

15

then on the third degree felony convictions for possession of

16

a controlled substance

17

MR. HEWARD:

Those would not be offenses that I

18

think are enumerated under the violent offender statute.

19

don't think you can go back and enhance those.

20
21

THE COURT:

MR. GALLEGOS:

I haven't been on parole for three

years.

24
25

That goes back to the question I have.

Isn't he on parole?

22
23

I

MR. HEWARD:

He was not on parole when this offense

occurred.
16

MR, CAINE:

The ofTenses you h a d —

THE COURT:

When did the burglary occur?

MR, HEWARD:

The burglary was December of 1994.

had an original trial date in June of 19955

|| absconded or failed to show up.

8

9

He committed new offenses.
Was sentenced on that.

j| to trial on the drug offenses before your Honor.
convicted of some of those.

10

jumping.

11

offenses after this.

12

THE COURT:

13

Mr. Gallegos

The bail jumping issued

between—the bail jumping issued.
Pled guilty to the bail jumping.

Went!

Was

He was sentenced on the bail

That occurred after this.

II on the others.

We

That's clear.

And also the other

But he has been sentenced]

And I will make those sentences run

14

consecutive.

15

previously been sentenced to by me in January of this year.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

This sentence run consecutive to what he has

MR. HEWARD:

Just one procedural question.

I raised)

this when we were here I believe on the 13th when we set this
over for a special hearing.

I just want to make sure we have

a complete record.
We have not presented any evidence—and Mr. Caine
indicated for purposes of today that it was for legal
arguments only.

What I am not sure of is whether we have a

stipulation, which I believe would be sufficient, as to the
Defendant's prior convictions,, the 1981 attempted robbery and
the subsequent burglary, both of which resulted in him being
17

1

sentenced to the Utah State Prison.

I am not sure we have a

2

stipulation and/or evidence before Your Honor necessary for

3

you to make this.

4

The Court is aware of what those are.

THE COURT:

Except I think Mr. Caine indicated—

5

MR. CAINE:

Those—

6

THE COURT:

Paragraphs 1 through 5, he agreed with.

7

MR. CAINE:

That's right, I accepted that as the

8
9

stipulated—
MR. HEWARD:

Great.

I wanted to make sure that

10

became a part of the record.

11

referring to paragraphs 1 through 5 in the memorandum the

12

State submitted talking about his prior history.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT:

And your Honor is specifically

That was the statement of facts the

Court accepted, and upon which it based its decision.
MR. HEWARD:
MR. CAINE:

Thank you.
That's correct.

The only thing I ask,

because I contemplate there is going to be an appeal, I don't
know whether it may be proper for the State to do it, we would
probably want to have in this case Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law,, based upon your decision on this
particular issue so that that could be signed and filed.
MR. HEWARD:
THE COURT:

And I am happy to prepare those.
Why don't you include in the Findings

then the robbery conviction—excuse me, the burglary
conviction, and then also the convictions in January for the
18

drug charges so it is clear also where the Court imposed the
consecutive sentences.
MR. CAINE:

That will be fine.

Thank you, your

THE COURT:

The Court does that under the provisions;

Honor.

of 76-3-501.

Why I imposed consecutive sentences, this is a j

serious offense.

In looking at his past history and

rehabilitative needs, I think it is appropriate for

[

consecutive sentences.

j

Just looking at the totality of his

record, this man has been frankly a burden to the criminal
justice system for many, many years.

I don't think the

sentences that I have imposed are oppressive or inequitable ini
any way.

j
MR. REWARD: Thank you.

|

19

35
SO -THE COURT:

IT'g MY RECOLLECTION THAT WHEN THERE WAS

A MOTION PREVIOUSLY BY YOU TO EXCLUDE THE EVIDENCE, THAT WAS
THE BASIS FOR MISTRIAL BEFORE.
MR. CAINE:

THAT'S CORRECT.

THE COURT:

THAT WHEN I GOT BACK ON THE BENCH, I GOT

LOOKING AT SOME OF THE ANNOTATIONS IN THE CASES AND CONCLUDED
THAT I HAD ERRED AS TO THE OBJECTION THAT YOU HAD PREVIOUSLY
9II MADE, SO THAT I HAD CALLED A RECESS, BROUGHT US INTO CHAMBERS.
10

I DISCUSSED WITH YOU WHAT I FELT WAS THE LAW AT THAT TIMS.

11

AND MY RECOLLECTION IS THAT YOU MADE A MOTION FOR MISTRIAL, IS

12

THAT CORRECT --

13

MR. CAINE:

THAT'S CORRECT.

14

THE COURT:

--MR. CAINE?

AND I BELIEVE THAT WHERE

15

THE DEFENDANT MOVES FOR A MISTRIAL, THE COURT GRANTS IT, THAT

16

THERE IS NOT JEOPARDY ATTACHING.

17

MR. CAINE:

OKAY.

18

THE COURT:

ON THE SUBSTANTIVE BASIS AS WELL AS THE

19

LET'S GO FORWARD.

PROCEDURAL BASIS NOTED BY THE PROSECUTOR, I DENY THE MOTION.

20

OPEN COURT

21

(WHEREUPON THE COURT READ THE PRELIMINARY

22

JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY.)

23

THE COURT:

MR. HEWARD, WE'LL BEGIN WITH YOU PLEASE.

24

MR. HEWARD:

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

25
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1

THE COURT:

RECORD M A Y SHOW T H A T THE J U R Y HAS

2

R E T U R N E D TO THE COURTROOM.

3

M E M B E R S TO BE F O R E P E R S O N ?

4

VERDICT,

H A V E Y O U CHOSEN ONE OF YOUR
VERY GOOD.

HAVE YOU REACHED

SIR?

5

MR. B A R R E T T :

YES, WE HAVE.

6

THE COURT:

W O U L D Y O U HAND T H A T TO THE

7

10

BAILIFF

PLEASE?

8
9

A

THE BAILIFF:
ALL.

HAND M E E V E R Y T H I N G P L E A S E .

I'LL TAKE

IT

T H A N K YOU.
THE COURT:

IT D O E S A P P E A R T H A T THE J U R Y HAS

WOULD Y O U R I S E , MR. GALLEGOS?

REACHED

11

A VERDICT.

V E R D I C T FORM R E A D S ,

12

W E T H E J U R Y IMPANELED TO T R Y T H E ISSUES IN THE

13

M A T T E R DO H E R E B Y FIND THE D E F E N D A N T G U I L T Y OF C O U N T O N E ,

14

B U R G L A R Y , A SECOND DEGREE F E L O N Y .

15

T H E F T , A CLASS-B

ABOVE-ENTITLED

AND G U I L T Y OF C O U N T TWO,

MISDEMEANOR.

16

W O U L D Y O U L I K E THE J U R Y P O L L E D , MR.

CAINE?

17

MR. CAINE:

NO, Y O U R

18

THE COURT:

L A D I E S A N D G E N T L E M E N , THANK Y O U V E R Y

HONOR.

19

M U C H FOR YOUR S E R V I C E T H E S E P A S T TWO D A Y S .

WE A P P R E C I A T E

THE

20

ATTENTION THAT YOU HAVE SHOWN.

21

A N D Y O U ' V E B E E N O B V I O U S L Y I N T E R E S T E D A N D ENGAGED

22

AND I APPRECIATE THE SACRIFICES THAT YOU PERHAPS PERSONALLY

23

H A V E M A D E TO S E R V E .

24

I'M NOW GOING TO EXCUSE YOU WITH MY SINCERE THANKS.

25

P O I N T , Y O U ' R E FREE TO T A L K A B O U T T H E CASE W I T H A N Y O N E A N D

I WATCHED YOU DURING THE TRIAL
IN T H I S

CASE

I A P P R E C I A T E YOUR EFFORTS V E R Y V E R Y MUCH.

AT THIS

